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Abstract. In this paper we present three digital signature schemes with tight security reductions.
Our rst signature scheme is a particularly ecient version of the short exponent discrete log based
scheme of Girault et al. (J. of Cryptology 2006). Our scheme has a tight reduction to the decisional
Short Discrete Logarithm problem, while still maintaining the non-tight reduction to the computational
version of the problem upon which the original scheme of Girault et al. is based. The second signature
scheme we construct is a modication of the scheme of Lyubashevsky (Asiacrypt 2009) that is based
on the worst-case hardness of the shortest vector problem in ideal lattices. And the third scheme is a
very simple signature scheme that is based directly on the hardness of the Subset Sum problem. We
also present a general transformation that converts, what we term lossy identication schemes, into
signature schemes with tight security reductions. We believe that this greatly simplies the task of
constructing and proving the security of such signature schemes.
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1 Introduction
Due to the widespread use of digital signature schemes in practical applications, their construction and secu-
rity analysis comprises an important area of modern cryptography. While there exist many digital signatures
that are secure in the standard model (e.g. [GHR99,CS00,HW09,CHKP10,Boy10]), they are usually less ef-
cient than those that are proved secure in the random oracle model, and so are not as suitable for practical
applications. Signature schemes secure in the random oracle model generally fall into one of two categories.
In the rst category are schemes constructed using the Full Domain Hash (FDH) approach [BR96], and in
the second are schemes based on the Fiat-Shamir technique [FS87]. Our current work focuses on the latter
type.
Proving the security of schemes that are designed using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic (e.g. [GQ90,Sch91,GPS06])
generally involves an invocation of the forking lemma [PS00]. Reductions with this feature entail getting one
forgery from the adversary, then rewinding him back to a particular point, and then re-running the adversary
from that point with the hope of getting another forgery. Using these two related forgeries, the reduction
can extract an answer to some underlying hard problem such as discrete log or factorization. Due to the
fact that two related forgeries are required and one also needs to guess on which of the qh of his random
oracle query the adversary will forge on, a reduction using an adversary that succeeds with probability "
in forging a signature will have probability "2=qh of breaking the hardness assumption. Asymptotically, this
does not cause a problem, since the reduction only incurs a polynomial loss in the success probability. The
reduction does not, however, provide us with useful guidance for setting concrete parameters because it is
unclear whether the eciency loss is just an artifact of the proof or whether it represents an actual weakness
of the scheme. It is therefore preferable to construct protocols that have a tight proof of security by avoiding
the use of the forking lemma.1.1 Related Work and Contributions
Constructing number-theoretic signature schemes with tight security reductions has received some attention
in the past. The rst work in this direction is due to Bellare and Rogaway [BR96], who proposed an RSA-based
signature scheme known as PSS whose security is tightly related to the security of the RSA function. Later, in
the context of signature schemes based on the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, Micali and Reyzin [MR02] showed that
it is sometimes possible to modify the Fiat-Shamir transform in order to achieve tighter reductions. In more
recent work, Goh and Jarecki [GJ03] and Katz and Wang [KW03,GJKW07] constructed digital signatures
with tight security reductions based on the Computational and Decisional Die-Hellman problems. These
latter two schemes are versions of the Schnorr signature scheme, and thus inherit most of its characteristics.
In particular, the scheme based on the DDH problem has a very simple construction and a rather short
signature size. There are other signature schemes, though, that possess other desirable features, but do not
yet have a tight security reduction. A notable example of such a scheme is the one of Girault, Poupard,
and Stern [GPS06] which is extremely ecient when the signer is allowed to perform pre-processing before
receiving the signature. One of the contributions of this paper is a construction of a scheme that possesses
all the advantages of the scheme in [GPS06] in addition to having a tight security reduction.
As far as we are aware, there has not been any previous work that specically considered tight reductions
for lattice-based signatures. Similar to number-theoretic constructions, lattice-based signatures secure in
the random oracle model are built using either the Full Domain Hash [GPV08,SSTX09,MP12] or the Fiat-
Shamir [MV03,Lyu08,KTX08,Lyu09,Lyu12] methodologies. While FDH-based lattice signatures have tight
reductions, the currently most ecient lattice-based schemes (in terms of both the signature size and the
running time) are those based on the Fiat-Shamir framework [Lyu09,Lyu12]. And so it is an interesting
problem whether it's possible to construct an ecient Fiat-Shamir based scheme that has tight reductions.
The construction of such a scheme is another contribution of this work, though it is unfortunately a little
less ecient than the ones in [Lyu09,Lyu12].
The third scheme that we construct in our work is based on the hardness of the low-density subset sum
problem. Due to a known reduction from subset sum to lattice problems [LO83,Fri86], all signature schemes
based on lattices are already based on subset sum. The aforementioned reduction, however, incurs a loss, and
so the lattice-based schemes are not based on as hard a version of subset sum as we achieve in this paper by
building a scheme directly on subset sum. Additionally, our scheme is surprisingly simple (to describe and
to prove) and we believe that it could be of theoretical interest.
Proving schemes secure using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic is usually done by rst building a 3-move identi-
cation scheme secure against passive adversaries, and then applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation, which
was proven in [AABN02] to yield provably secure signatures. The advantage of building schemes using this
modular approach is that one does not have to deal with any (usually messy) issues pertaining to random
oracles when building the identication scheme { all mention of random oracles is delegated to the black-box
transformation. For signature schemes with tight security reductions, however, this construction method does
not work. The reason is that the transformation of [AABN02] inherently loses a factor of qh in the success
probability of the impersonator to the ID scheme in relation to the forger of the signature scheme, which
results in a non-tight security reduction.
In this paper, we give a black-box transformation analogous to that of [AABN02] that converts what we
call, lossy identication schemes into signature schemes with tight security reductions. Roughly speaking,
a lossy identication scheme is a three move commit-challenge-response identication scheme that satises
the following four simple properties:
1. Completeness: the verication algorithm must accept a valid interaction with non-negligible probability.
2. Simulatability: there is a simulator, who does not have access to the secret key, who is able to produce
valid interaction transcripts that are statistically indistinguishable from real ones.
3. Key indistinguishability: there is an algorithm that produces lossy keys that are computationally indis-
tinguishable from the real keys.
4. Lossiness: when the keys are lossy, it is statistically impossible to provide a valid response to a random
challenge after making a commitment.
2Properties 1 and 2 are generally true of all identication schemes, whereas properties 3 and 4 are particular
to the lossy case and are crucially required for obtaining a tight black-box transformation. Our transformation
converts a lossy identication scheme into a signature scheme and proves that a successful forger can be
converted into a successful impersonator to the identication scheme. Since the only non-statistical property
in the denition above is property 3, it means that the successful impersonator breaks this property, which
is where we will plant the instance of the hard problem that we are trying to solve. We demonstrate the
usefulness and generality of this approach by building our signature schemes in this way.
1.2 Overview of Our Signature Schemes
Construction based on the (decisional) Short Discrete Logarithm Problem. The (computational)
c-Discrete Logarithm with Short Exponent (c-DLSE) problem in a cyclic group G with generator g is the
well-studied problem of recovering the discrete logarithm x of a given group element gx when x is a c-bit
long integer, c being typically much smaller than the bit-size of G. Pollard's lambda algorithm [Pol00] solves
this problem in time O(2c=2), but when G is a subgroup of prime order in Z
p and c is at least twice the
security parameter (c = 160 for the 80-bit security level, say), the c-DLSE problem is believed to be as
hard as the full-length discrete logarithm problem [vW96,PS98a]. A number of cryptographic schemes are
based on the hardness of the c-DLSE problem, including pseudorandom bit generators [PS98a,Gen00,Gen05],
key agreement protocols [GKR04] and signature schemes including Girault-Poupard-Stern (GPS) signatures
[PS98b,GPS06].
Like other discrete log-based schemes [Sch91,KW03,CM05], GPS is an online/oine scheme in the sense of
Even, Goldreich and Micali [EGM90,EGM96]: when preprocessing can be done prior to receiving the message
to be signed, signature generation becomes very ecient. The main advantage of GPS signatures, however,
is that this online signature generation step doesn't even require a modular reduction, which according to
the work of [SOSH10], can save as much as 60% of the signing time, which makes the scheme extremely
well-suited for situations where processing time is at a premium.
Our scheme, described in Section 4, is very similar to the scheme of [GPS06], but with some tweaks making
it possible to choose smaller parameters. Moreover, while the security proof for GPS is a very loose reduction
to the computational c-DLSE problem, our security proof provides a tight reduction, which is however to the
decisional short discrete log problem (c-DSDL). Informally, the c-DSDL problem asks to distinguish between
a pair (g;gx) where x is c-bit long and a pair (g;h) where h is uniformly random. No better algorithm is
known for solving this problem than actually computing the discrete logarithm and checking whether it is
small|in fact, a search-to-decision reduction was established by Koshiba and Kurosawa [KK04].
Given the pair (g;gx), we set it as the public key, which by our assumption is computationally indis-
tinguishable from (g;gx) where x is random (i.e. not small). We then build an identication scheme that
satises our simulatability requirement, and furthermore show that it is information-theoretically impossible
to respond to a random challenge if x is not small. Using our transformation to signatures, this implies that
if a forger can produce a valid forgery, then he can respond to a random challenge, which would mean that
x is small.
In the end, we obtain a tightly-secure scheme which is quite ecient in terms of size (signatures are
around 320-bits long at the 80-bit security level) and speed, especially when used with coupons (in which case
signature generation only requires a single multiplication between integers of 80 and 160 bits respectively).
Construction Based on the Shortest Vector Problem in Ideal Lattices. In Section 5, we give a
construction of a signature scheme based on the hardness of the approximate worst-case shortest vector
problem in ideal lattices. Our scheme is a modication of the scheme in [Lyu09] that eliminates the need to
use the forking lemma. The scheme in [Lyu09] was shown to be secure based on the hardness of the Ring-SIS
problem, which was previously shown to be as hard as worst-case ideal lattice problems [LM06,PR06]. In this
work, we construct a similar scheme, but instead have it based on the hardness of the Ring-LWE problem,
which was recently shown to also be as hard as the worst-case shortest vector problem under quantum
reductions [LPR10].
3The secret key in our scheme consists of two vectors s1;s2 with small coecients in the ring R =
Zq[x]=(xn +1), and the public key consists of a random element a 2 R and t = as1 +s2. The Ring-LWE
reduction states that distinguishing (a;t) from a uniformly random pair in R  R is as hard as solving
worst-case lattice problems. In our identication scheme, the commitment is the polynomial ay1 +y2 where
y1;y2 are elements in R chosen with a particular distribution. The challenge is an element c 2 R with small
coecients, and the response is (z1;z2) where z1 = y1+s1c and z2 = y2+s2c. As in [Lyu09], the procedure
sometimes aborts in order to make sure that the distribution of (z1;z2) is independent of the secret keys.
The verication procedure checks that z1;z2 have \small" coecients, and that az1 + z2   ct = ay1 + y2.
The crux of the security proof lies in showing that whenever (a;t) is truly random, it is information-
theoretically impossible to produce a valid response to a random challenge. Proving this part in our security
reduction requires analyzing the ideal structure of the ring R using techniques similar to the ones in [Mic07].
This analysis is somewhat loose, however, so that the resulting signature scheme is not as ecient as the
one in [Lyu09]. We believe that improving the analysis (possibly using some recent techniques in [SS11]) and
obtaining a more ecient signature scheme is an interesting research direction.
Construction Based on Subset Sum. In Section 6, we present a very simple scheme based on the
hardness of the subset sum problem. The secret key consists of an n  k 0=1 matrix X, and the public key
consists of a random vector a 2 Zn
M, as well as a k-dimensional vector of subset sums t = aTX mod M that
use a as weights. The main idea for constructing the lossy identication scheme is to achieve the property
that if the vector t is uniformly random, rather than being a vector of valid subset sums, then it should be
impossible (except with a small probability) to produce a valid response to a random challenge. And so an
adversary who is able to break the resulting signature scheme can be used to distinguish vectors t that are
valid subset sums of the elements in a from those that are just uniformly random. We defer further details
to Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Decisional Short Discrete Logarithm Problem
Let G be a nite, cyclic group of prime order q whose group operation is noted multiplicatively, and g a xed
generator of G. Let further c be a size parameter. The c-decisional discrete logarithm (c-DSDL) problem may
be informally described as the problem of distinguishing between tuples of the form (g;h) for a uniformly
random h 2 G and tuples of the form (g;gx) with x uniformly random in f0;:::;2c   1g. More precisely:
Denition 1. A distinguishing algorithm D is said to (t;")-solve the c-DSDL problem in group G if D runs
in time at most t and satises:

Pr[x
$   Zq : D(g;gx) = 1]   Pr[x
$   f0;:::;2c   1g : D(g;gx) = 1]

  "
We say that G is a (t;")-c-DSDL group if no algorithm (t;")-solves the c-DSDL problem in G.
This problem is related to the well-known (computational) c-discrete logarithm with short exponent
(c-DLSE) problem. In fact, for the groups where that problem is usually considered, namely prime order
subgroups of Z
p where p is a safe prime, a search-to-decision reduction is known for all c [KK04]: if the
c-DLSE problem is hard, then so is the c-DSDL problem. The reduction is not tight, however, so while
the signature scheme presented in Section 4 admits a tight reduction to the decisional problem, there is a
polynomial loss in the reduction to the search problem.
2.2 The Ring-LWE Problem and Lattices
For any positive integer n and any positive real , the distribution DZn; assigns the probability proportional
to e kyk
2=
2
to every y 2 Zn and 0 everywhere else. For any odd prime p, the ring R = Zp[x]=(xn + 1) is
4represented by polynomials of degree at most n 1 with coecients in the range

 
p 1
2 ;
p 1
2

. As an additive
group, R is isomorphic to Zn
p, and we use the notation y
$   DR; to mean that a vector y is chosen from the
distribution DZn; and then mapped to a polynomial in R in the natural way (i.e. position i of the vector
corresponds to the coecient of the xi term of the polynomial).
The (decisional) Ring Learning With Errors Problem (Ring-LWE) over the ring R with standard devi-
ation  is to distinguish between the following two oracles: O0 outputs random elements in RR, while the
oracle O1 has a secret s 2 R where s
$   DR;, and on every query it chooses a uniformly random element
a
$   R, e
$   DR;, and outputs (a;as+e). The Ring-LWE problem is a natural generalization of the LWE
problem [Reg09] to rings and it was recently shown in [LPR10] that if p = poly(n) is a prime congruent to
1 mod 2n, then solving the Ring-LWE problem over the ring R with standard deviation3  is as hard as
nding an approximate shortest vector in all ideal lattices in the ring Z[x]=(xn + 1). Intuitively, the smaller
the ratio between p and  is, the smaller the vector the reduction is able to nd, and thus it is preferable to
keep this ratio low.
Note also that for such a choice of parameters (p  1 mod 2n, which implies in particular p = 
(n) and
R  = Zn
p), the Ring-LWE problem as dened above is equivalent to the same decisional problem, but where
the element a is chosen as a uniformly random invertible element of R instead, and the adversary has to
distinguish (a;as+e) from a uniformly random element of R R. This is because the fraction (1  1=p)n
of elements of R which are invertible is constant. In this paper, we will refer to both equivalent variants of
the problem as Ring-LWE.
2.3 The Subset Sum Problem
In the search version of the random subset sum problem, SS(n;M), one is given n elements ai generated
uniformly at random in ZM (in this paper, we will only deal with low-density instances of the problem, where
M > 2n) and an element t =
P
aisi mod M, where the si are randomly chosen from f0;1g, and is asked to
nd the si (with high probability, there is only one possible set of si). The decision version of the problem,
which was shown to be as hard as the search version [IN96,MM11], is to distinguish an instance (a1;:::;an;t)
where t = a1x1+:::+ansn mod M from the instance (a1;:::;an;t) where t is uniformly random in ZM. The
low-density SS(n;M) problem is hardest when M  2n, in which case the best algorithm runs in time 2
(n)
(see for example [BCJ11]), but the best known algorithms for the problem when M = nO(n), still require
time 2
(n). As M increases, however, the problem becomes easier, until it is solvable in polynomial-time
when M = 2
(n
2) [LO83,Fri86].
2.4 Signature Schemes
Denition 2. A signature scheme Sig is composed of three algorithms (KeyGen;Sign;Verify) such that:
{ The key generation algorithm KeyGen takes as input the security parameter in unary notation and outputs
a pair (pk;sk) containing the public verication key and the secret signing key.
{ The signing algorithm Sign takes as input a message m and the signing key sk and outputs a signature
. This algorithm can be probabilistic so that many signatures can be computed for the same message.
{ The verication algorithm Verify takes as input a message m, a signature  and the public key pk and
outputs 1 if the signature is correct and 0 otherwise.
The standard security notion for signature scheme is existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-
message attacks [GMR88] which informally means that, after obtaining signatures on polynomially many
arbitrary messages of his choice, an adversary cannot produce a valid signature for a new message.
3 In the actual reduction of [LPR10], the standard deviation is itself chosen from a somewhat complicated probability
distribution, but if the number of times the Ring-LWE oracle is queried is bounded (in this paper it only needs
to provide one output), then the standard deviation can be xed.
5Denition 3. Let Sig = (KeyGen;Sign;Verify) be a signature scheme and let H be a random oracle. We
say that Sig is (t;qh;qs;")-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks, if there is no
algorithm F that runs in time at most t, while making at most qh hash queries and at most qs signing queries,
such that
Pr[(pk;sk)   KeyGen(1k);(m;)   FSign(sk;);H()(pk) :
m = 2 S ^ Verify(m;;pk) = 1]  ";
where S is the set of messages queried to the signing oracle.
Furthermore, we say that a signature scheme is strong existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-
message attacks if, after obtaining signatures on polynomially many arbitrary messages of his choice, an
adversary cannot produce a new valid signature, even for a message m for which he already knows a correct
signature.
Denition 4. Let Sig = (KeyGen;Sign;Verify) be a signature scheme and let H be a random oracle. We say
that Sig is (t;qh;qs;")-strongly existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks, if there is
no algorithm F that runs in time at most t, while making at most qh hash queries and at most qs signing
queries, such that
Pr[(pk;sk)   KeyGen(1k);(m;)   FSign(sk;);H()(pk) :
(m;) = 2 S ^ Verify(m;;pk) = 1]  ";
where S is the set of message-signature pairs obtained via queries to the signing oracle.
3 Lossy Identication Schemes
In order to unify the security proofs of our signature schemes without sacricing the tightness of the reduction,
we introduce in this section a new class of identication schemes, called lossy identication schemes. In these
schemes, the public key associated with the prover can take one of two indistinguishable forms, called normal
and lossy. When the public key is normal, the scheme behaves as a standard identication scheme with similar
security guarantees against impersonation attacks. However, in the lossy case, the public key may not have
a corresponding secret key and no prover (even computationally unbounded ones) should be able to make
the verier accept with non-negligible probability.
As with other identication schemes used to build signature schemes via the Fiat-Shamir transform, the
identication schemes that we consider in this paper consist of a canonical three-move protocol, as dened
in [AABN02]. In these protocols, the verier's move consists in choosing a random string from the challenge
space and sending it to the prover. Moreover, its nal decision is a deterministic function of the conversation
transcript and the public key. Since our results can be seen as a generalization of the results of Abdalla et
al. [AABN02] to the lossy setting, we use their denitions as the basis for ours below.
Denition 5. A lossy identication scheme ID is dened by a tuple (KeyGen;LosKeyGen;Prove;c;Verify)
such that:
{ KeyGen is the normal key generation algorithm which takes as input the security parameter in unary
notation and outputs a pair (pk;sk) containing the publicly available verication key and the prover's
secret key.
{ LosKeyGen is the lossy key generation algorithm which takes as input the security parameter in unary
notation and outputs a lossy verication key pk.
{ Prove is the prover algorithm which takes as input the current conversation transcript and outputs the
next message to be sent to the verier.
{ c(k) is a function of the security parameter which determines the length of the challenge sent by the
verier.
6{ Verify is a deterministic algorithm which takes the conversation transcript as input and outputs 1 to
indicate acceptance or 0 otherwise.
Following [AABN02], we associate to ID, k, and (pk;sk) a randomized transcript generation oracle
Tr
ID
pk;sk;k which takes no inputs and returns a random transcript of an \honest" execution. However, to
adapt it to specic setting of our schemes, we modify to the original denition to take into account the pos-
sibility that the prover may fail and output ? as response during the execution of the identication protocol.
Moreover, when this happens, instead of outputting (cmt;ch;?), our transcript generation oracle will simply
return a triplet (?;?;?) to simulate the scenario in which the verier simply forgets failed identication
attempts. Interestingly, as we show later in this section, this weaker requirement is sucient for building
secure signature schemes as failed impersonation attempts will be kept hidden from the adversary since the
tasks of generating the commitment and challenge are performed by the signer. More precisely, the transcript
generation oracle Tr
ID
pk;sk;k is dened as follows:
Tr
ID
pk;sk;k():
1: cmt
$   Prove(sk)
2: ch
$   f0;1gc(k)
3: rsp
$   Prove(sk;cmt;ch)
4: if rsp = ? then (cmt;ch)   (?;?)
5: return (cmt;ch;rsp)
Denition 6. An identication scheme is said to be lossy if it has the following properties:
1. Completeness of normal keys. We say that ID is -complete, where  is a non-negligible func-
tion of k, if for every security parameter k and all honestly generated keys (pk;sk)
$   KeyGen(1k),
Verify(pk;cmt;ch;rsp) = 1 holds with probability  when (cmt;ch;rsp)
$   Tr
ID
pk;sk;k().
2. Simulatability of transcripts. Let (pk;sk) be the output of KeyGen(1k) for a security parameter k.
Then, we say that ID is "-simulatable if there exists a PPT algorithm e Tr
ID
pk;k with no access to the secret
key sk which can generate transcripts f(cmt;ch;rsp)g whose distribution is statistically indistinguishable
from the transcripts output by Tr
ID
pk;sk;k, where " is an upper-bound for the statistical distance. When
" = 0, then ID is said to be perfectly simulatable.
3. Indistinguishability of keys. Consider the experiments Exp
ind-keys-real
ID;D (k) and Exp
ind-keys-lossy
ID;D (k)
in which we generate pk via KeyGen(1k), respectively LosKeyGen(1k), and provide it as input to the
distinguishing algorithm D. We say that D can (t;")-solve the key-indistinguishability problem if D runs
in time t and  Pr[Exp
ind-keys-real
ID;D (k) = 1]   Pr[Exp
ind-keys-lossy
ID;D (k) = 1]
   ":
Furthermore, we say that ID is (t;")-key-indistinguishable if no algorithm (t;")-solves the key-indistinguishability
problem.
4. Lossiness. Let I be an impersonator, st be its state, and k be a security parameter. Let Exp
los-imp-pa
ID;I (k)
be the following experiment played between I and a hypothetical challenger:
Exp
los-imp-pa
ID;I (k):
1: pk
$   LosKeyGen(1k)
2: (st;cmt)
$   I
e Tr
ID
pk;k(pk) ; ch
$   f0;1gc(k) ; rsp
$   I(st;ch)
3: return Verify(pk;cmt;ch;rsp)
We say I "-solves the impersonation problem with respect to lossy keys if
Pr[Exp
los-imp-pa
ID;I (k) = 1]  ":
Furthermore, we say that ID is "-lossy if no (computationally unrestricted) algorithm "-solves the imper-
sonation problem with respect to lossy keys.
7KeyGen(1
k):
1: (pk;sk)
$   KeyGen(1
k)
2: return (pk;sk)
Sign(sk;m):
1: ctr   0
2: while ctr  ` and rsp = ? do
3: ctr   ctr + 1
4: cmt   Prove(sk)
5: ch   H(cmt;m)
6: rsp   Prove(sk;cmt;ch)
7: end while
8: if rsp = ? then cmt   ?
9:    (cmt;rsp)
10: return 
Verify(pk;m;):
1: parse  as (cmt;rsp)
2: ch   H(cmt;m)
3: d   Verify(pk;cmt;ch;rsp)
4: return d
Fig.1. Description of our signature scheme Sig[ID;`] = (KeyGen;Sign;Verify), where ID = (KeyGen;LosKeyGen;Prove;
c;Verify) is a lossy identication scheme, H is a random oracle, and ` is a bound on the number of signing attempts.
As in [AABN02], we need to use the concept of min-entropy [CG85] to measure the maximum likelihood
that a commitment generated by the prover collides with a xed value. The precise denition of min-entropy
can be found in Denition 3.2 in [AABN02], which is restated in the context of lossy identication schemes
in Appendix B.
In order to prove that a signature scheme obtained via the Fiat-Shamir transform is strongly existentially
unforgeable, the underlying identication scheme will need to satisfy an additional property, called unique-
ness, which states that, given a valid transcript (cmt;ch;rsp) with respect to a public key pk, the probability
that there exists a new response value rsp0 6= rsp for which (cmt;ch;rsp0) is a valid transcript is negligible.
Denition 7. Let ID = (KeyGen;LosKeyGen;Prove;c;Verify) be a lossy identication scheme and let pk be
the output of LosKeyGen(1k) for a security parameter k. Let (cmt;ch;rsp) be a valid transcript output by
a lossy transcript generation function e Tr
ID
pk;k(). We say that ID is "-unique with respect to lossy keys if the
probability that there exists a new response value rsp0 6= rsp for which Verify(pk;cmt;ch;rsp0) = 1 is at most
", and perfectly unique if no such response value exists at all.
Transform. The signature schemes that we consider in this paper are built from lossy identication schemes
via the Fiat-Shamir transform [FS87], in which the challenge becomes the hash of the message together with
the commitment. However, since we do not assume perfect completeness of normal keys for the underlying
lossy identication scheme, the signing algorithm will dier slightly from those considered in [AABN02] in or-
der to decrease the probability of abort during signing. More precisely, let ID = (KeyGen;LosKeyGen;Prove;c;
Verify) be a lossy identication scheme and let H be a random oracle. Let ` be a parameter dening the max-
imum number of signing attempts. We can construct a signature scheme Sig[ID;`] = (KeyGen;Sign;Verify),
as depicted in Figure 1.
We remark that the signature length of the scheme in Figure 1 can sometimes be optimized by setting
 = (ch;rsp). However, this is only possible when the commitment value cmt is uniquely dened by (ch;
rsp), which is the case for all the schemes considered in this paper.
Theorem 1. Let ID = (KeyGen;LosKeyGen;Prove;c;Verify) be a lossy identication scheme whose commit-
ment space has min-entropy (k), let H be a random oracle, and let Sig[ID] = (KeyGen;Sign;Verify) be the
signature scheme obtained via the transform in Figure 1. If ID is "s-simulatable, -complete, (t0;"k)-key-
indistinguishable, and "`-lossy, then Sig[ID] is (t;qh;qs;")-existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-
message attacks in the random oracle model for:
" = "k + qs"s + (qh + 1)"` + `(qs + qh + 1)qs=2
t  t0   O(qs  tSign)
8where tSign denotes the average signing time. Furthermore, if ID is "c-unique, then Sig[ID] is (t;qh;qs;")-
strongly existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model for:
" = "k + qs("s + "c) + (qh + 1)"` + `(qs + qh + 1)qs=2
t  t0   O(qs  tSign)
Finally, the probability that Sig[ID] outputs a valid signature is 1   (1   )`.
Proof overview. In order to prove the security of the signature scheme based on the security properties
of the underlying lossy identication scheme, the main idea is to use honest transcripts generated by the
identication scheme to answer signature queries made the adversary by appropriately programming the
random oracle. More precisely, let (cmt;ch;rsp) be a valid transcript (i.e., Verify(pk;cmt;ch;rsp) = 1). To
answer a query m to the signing oracle, we need to program the random oracle to set H(cmt;m) = ch so
that (cmt;rsp) is a valid signature for m. Unfortunately, this programming may conict with previous values
output by the hash oracle. To address this problem, the rst step of the proof is to show that such collisions
happen with with probability at most `(qs + qh + 1)qs=2.
Next, we make a sequence of small changes to the security experiment to be able to bound the success
probability of the forger. The rst signicant modication is to change the simulation of the signing oracle so
that it no longer uses the secret key. This is done by replacing the transcript generation oracle Tr
ID
pk;sk;k with
its simulated version e Tr
ID
pk;k. Since we make at most qs calls to e Tr
ID
pk;k, the dierence in the success probability
of the forger changes by at most qs"s due to the simulatability of ID.
The second important modication is to replace the key generation algorithm with its lossy version.
Since the secret key is no longer needed in the simulation of the signing oracle, the dierence in the success
probability of the forger changes by at most "k due to the key-indistinguishability of ID.
The third signicant modication, which only applies to the case of the proof of strong existential un-
forgeability, is to abort whenever the adversary outputs a valid forgery (m;(cmt;rsp)) for which (cmt;rsp0)
was one of the values returned by the signing oracle on input m and rsp0 6= rsp. Clearly, the dierence in
the success probability of the forger changes by at most qs"c due to the uniqueness of ID.
Finally, we can bound the success probability of the forger in this nal experiment by relating this
probability with that of solving the impersonation problem with respect to lossy keys. Since we need to
guess the hash query which will be used in the forgery to be able to break the underlying impersonation
problem, we lose a factor qh + 1 in the reduction, resulting in the term (qh + 1)"` in the theorem.
Proof details. In order to prove Theorem 1, we will use a sequence Exp0;:::;Exp6 of hybrid experiments,
where Exp0 is the actual experiment dening the strong existential unforgeability of the signature scheme
and Exp6 is an experiment in which we can easily bound the success probability of the forger. For i = 0;:::;6,
we also dene an event i which corresponds to the probability that the adversary F successfully outputs a
valid forgery in experiment Expi.
For simplicity, we will assume in the remainder of the proof that the set of hash queries made by adversary
against the strong existential unforgeability of the signature scheme always includes the the pair (cmt;m)
involved in the forgery. This is without loss of generality since, given an adversary that does not ask such
query to the hash oracle, we can always build another adversary with the same success probability and
approximately the same running time which will always ask such query. This will however increase the total
number of hash queries by 1.
Exp0. In this experiment, the (hypothetical) challenger runs (pk;sk)
$   KeyGen(1k), sets the hash (hc)
and sign counters (sc) to 0, initializes the list of hash queries and responses to empty, and returns pk to the
forger F.
Whenever F asks a hash query (cmt;m), the challenger checks if this query has already been asked and
returns the same answer if this is the case. If this is a new query, then the challenger chooses a random string
9ch from the challenge space and returns it to F. It also increments hc by 1, adds (cmt;m) and ch to the list
of hash queries and responses.
Whenever F asks for a sign query m, the challenger computes the signature  as in the signing algorithm
(i.e, 
$   Sign(sk;m)), increments sc by 1, and returns  = (cmt;rsp) to F. In doing so, it checks whether
H(cmt;m) has already been dened. If it hasn't, then the challenger chooses a new value ch from the
challenge space, sets H(cmt;m) = ch, and computes rsp using this value.
Finally, when F outputs a forgery (m;), where  was not outputted by the signing oracle on input m,
the challenger returns Verify(pk;m;) as the output of the experiment. By denition, we have Pr[0 ] = ".
Exp1. Let bad be a boolean variable initially set to false. In this experiment, the challenger changes the
simulation of the signing oracle so that it sets bad to true whenever H(cmt;m) has already been dened (i.e.,
H(cmt;m) 6= ?). Moreover, when bad is set, the challenger chooses a random value ch from the challenge
space and uses it (instead of predened value H(cmt;m)) to compute the response. If bad is not set, then
the challenger proceeds with the simulation as in Exp0.
Let Bad dene the event that a hash query causes the experiment to set bad to true. Clearly, the dierence
in the success probability between Exp0 and Exp1 can be upper-bounded by Pr[Bad] since these experiments
only dier after bad is set. To compute this probability, we can assume the worst-case in which all qh + 1
hash queries are asked at the beginning of the experiment. In this worst-case scenario, the probability that
the i-th signing query causes the experiment to set bad to true is (`(i 1)+qh +1)=2, where the factor ` is
due to the fact that signing oracle may attempt to generate a response up to ` times. By summing up over
all qs signing queries, we have Pr[Bad]  `(qs + qh + 1)qs=2. As a result, we have
 Pr[1 ]   Pr[0 ]
   `(qs + qh + 1)qs=2:
Exp2. In this experiment, the challenger changes the simulation of the signing oracle so that it no longer
sets the variable bad. Since the latter does not change the output of the experiment, we have Pr[ 2 ] = Pr[1 ].
Exp3. In this experiment, the challenger changes the simulation of the signing oracle so that the values
(cmt;ch;rsp) are computed using the transcript generation function Tr
ID
pk;sk;k as a subroutine. Since the
challenge values used to answer signing queries are chosen uniformly at random and independently of previous
hash queries since Exp1, this change does not aect the output of the experiment. Hence, Pr[3 ] = Pr[2 ].
Exp4. In this experiment, the challenger changes the simulation of the signing oracle so that the values
(cmt;ch;rsp) used to answer signing queries are computed right after the generation of the public and secret
keys, still using the transcript generation function Tr
ID
pk;sk;k as a subroutine. Since this change does not aect
the output of the experiment, we have Pr[4 ] = Pr[3 ].
Exp5. In this experiment, the challenger computes the values (cmt;ch;rsp) used to answer signing queries
using the simulated transcript generation function e Tr
ID
pk;k as a subroutine. Since we make at most qs calls to
e Tr
ID
pk;k and since the statistical distance between the distributions output by e Tr
ID
pk;k and Tr
ID
pk;sk;k is at most
"s due to the simulatability of ID, we have
 Pr[5 ]   Pr[4 ]
   `qs"s:
We note that at this point, the secret key is no longer needed in the experiment and all hash queries are
answered with random values in the challenge space. Moreover, all the values (cmt;ch;rsp) used to answer
signing queries are computed via the simulated transcript generation function e Tr
ID
pk;k at the beginning of the
experiment (after the key generation step) and independently of the hash queries.
Exp6. In this experiment, the challenger generates (pk;?) via LosKeyGen(1k). Since the secret key is no
longer needed in the experiment and the values (cmt;ch;rsp) are computed using e Tr
ID
pk;k as a subroutine, it
10is easy to build an adversary B that (t0;"0)-solves the key indistinguishability of ID if jPr[6 ] Pr[5 ]j = "0,
where t0  t + O(qs  tSign). Since, ID is (t0;")-key-indistinguishable by assumption, we have
 Pr[6 ]   Pr[5 ]
   "k:
Exp7. In this experiment, the challenger aborts whenever the adversary outputs a valid forgery (m;(cmt;rsp))
for which (cmt;rsp0) was one of the values returned by the signing oracle on input m and rsp0 6= rsp. Since
such forgeries are not considered valid under the existential unforgeability security notion, we have that
Pr[7 ] = Pr[6 ] in the case of the proof of existential unforgeability. Moreover, in the case of the proof of
strong existential unforgeability, the dierence in the success probability of the forger changes by at most
qs"c due to the uniqueness of ID. Hence,

Pr[7 ]   Pr[6 ]

  qs"c in the latter case.
We now claim that Pr[7 ]  (qh + 1)"`. To prove this, it suces to show that we can use the forger
F in Exp7 to build an adversary I that "-solves the impersonation problem with respect to lossy keys.
Let pk be the lossy key pk that I receives as input in Exp
los-imp-pa
ID;I (k). Next, I chooses a random index
in f1;:::;qh + 1g and runs F on input pk. As in Exp7, I computes the values (cmt;ch;rsp) using its
transcript generation oracle e Tr
ID
pk;k. Whenever F asks a j-th hash query (cmtj;mj), I rst checks if i = j.
If this is not the case, then I chooses a value ch uniformly at random from the challenge space and
returns it to F as in Exp7. However, if i = j, then I saves its internal state in st and returns cmti to its
challenger in Exp
los-imp-pa
ID;I (k). Let (st;ch
) be the input that I gets back from the challenger. I then sets
H(cmti;mi) = ch
 and returns it to F. It then continues the simulation exactly as in Exp7. Eventually,
F outputs a forgery (m;(cmt;rsp)). I then returns rsp as its output in Exp
los-imp-pa
ID;I (k). Clearly, I
simulates F's environment exactly as in Exp7. Moreover, if (cmt;m) = (cmti;mi), then the probability
that Exp
los-imp-pa
ID;I (k) outputs 1 is exactly the probability that Exp7 outputs 1. Since this happens with
probability 1=(qh + 1) and since ID is "`-lossy, it follows that
Pr[7 ]  (qh + 1)"`:
To conclude the proof, we point out that, since ID is -complete, the signing algorithm may fail to produce
a valid signature with probability (1   )`. u t
4 A Signature Scheme Based on the DSDL Problem
In this section we describe our short discrete log based signature scheme. While it looks similar to the prime-
order version of the Girault-Poupard-Stern identication scheme [Gir90,PS98b,GPS06], the proof strategy is
in fact closer to the one used by Katz and Wang for their DDH-based signature scheme [KW03,GJKW07].
We rst present a lossy identication scheme and then use the generic transformation from the previous
section to obtain the signature scheme.
Description of the lossy identication scheme. The full description of our lossy identication scheme
based on the DSDL Problem is provided in Figure 2. The public parameters of the identication scheme are
a cyclic group G of prime order q (typically chosen as the subgroup of order q in Z
p where p is prime), a
generator g of G, and size parameters c;k;k0. The secret key is a small (relative to q) integer x and the public
key consists of a single group element h = gx mod p. The prover's rst move is to generate a small (but
larger than x) random integer y and send u = gy as a commitment to the verier. Next, the (honest) verier
picks a value e uniformly in f0;:::;2k   1g and sends it to the prover. After receiving e from the verier,
the prover computes z = ex + y (without any modular reduction), and checks whether z is in the range
f2k+c;:::;2k+k
0+c  1g. If z is in the \correct" range, then the prover sends z to the verier, who can check
the verifying equation u = gz=he to authenticate the prover. If z is outside the correct range, the prover
sends ? to indicate failure|as in [Lyu08,Lyu09], this check is important to ensure that the distribution of
the value z is independent of the secret key x; it is worth noting that the original GPS scheme did not require
such checks, but required a larger \masking parameter" y.
11Parameters: G a subgroup of prime order q in Z

p , g a generator of G
Secret key: x
$   f0;:::;2
c   1g
Public key: h = g
x mod p
(Lossy key: h
$   G)
Prover Verier
1. y
$   f0;:::;2
k+k0+c   1g
u = g
y mod p u                               !
2. check e 2 f0;:::;2
k   1g e                                 e
$   f0;:::;2
k   1g
3. z = ex + y
If z = 2 f2
k+c;:::;2
k+k0+c   1g,
then z   ?. z                               ! check g
z  h
 e ? = u
and z 2 f2
k+c;:::;2
k+k0+c   1g
Fig.2. A lossy identication scheme based on DSDL.
Security of the identication scheme. As noted above, the scheme in Figure 2 is a secure lossy ID
scheme. More precisely, we establish the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If G is a (t;")-c-DSDL group, then the identication scheme in Figure 2 is perfectly simulat-
able, -complete, (t;")-key-indistinguishable, and "`-lossy, for:
 = 1   2 k
0
"`  22k+k
0+c+2=q + 1=2k:
It is also perfectly unique with respect to lossy keys.
We rst establish the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The probability that z = ex+y computed by the prover belongs to the correct interval f2k+c;:::;
2k+k
0+c   1g is 1   2 k
0
. In particular, the expected number of iterations required to identify the prover is
1=(1   2 k
0
). Moreover, the value z in the transcript is uniformly distributed in f2k+c;:::;2k+k
0+c   1g.
Proof. Since the distribution of e is independent of that of y, the value z = ex + y is uniformly dis-
tributed in the set fex;ex + 1;:::;ex + 2k+k
0+c   1g, which is of cardinal 2k+k
0+c and properly contains
G = f2k+c;:::;2k+k
0+c 1g. Therefore, the probability that z belongs to G is exactly jGj=2k+k
0+c = 1 2 k
0
as required. The expected number of iterations in the identication scheme follows immediately. Furthermore,
for any element z0 2 G we have:
Pr[z = z0jz 2 G] =
Pr[z = z0]
Pr[z 2 G]
=
1=2k+k
0+c
jGj=2k+k0+c =
1
jGj
and thus, provided that z passes the test in the verication step, we know that it is uniformly distributed in
G. Hence the nal claim. u t
With these lemmas, we are ready to establish the stated properties from Denition 6 and Denition 7,
namely completeness, simulatability of the transcripts, indistinguishability of the keys, lossiness and unique-
ness.
Completeness. If the public and secret keys are generated with the \normal" key generation algorithm, then
the interaction with an honest verier should result in acceptance with signicant probability. Lemma 1
shows that this probability is exactly 1   2 k
0
.
12Simulatability of the transcripts. Let Tr
ID
pk;sk be the honest transcript generation function corresponding
to a key pair (pk;sk) generated by the \normal" key generation algorithm. Recall from Section 3 that it
outputs the full transcript (cmt;ch;rsp) if rsp 6= ? and (?;?;?) otherwise. Then, there should exist an
ecient transcript generation simulator e Tr
ID
pk depending only on pk (not on sk) producing transcripts whose
distribution is statistically close to that of Tr
ID
pk;sk. We construct e Tr
ID
pk as follows. The public key pk consists of
a single group element h = gx 2 G. To generate a \simulated" transcript, e Tr
ID
pk picks z uniformly at random
in the range f2k+c;:::;2k+k
0+c   1g and chooses e uniformly at random in the range f0;:::;2k   1g. Then
it computes u as gz=he. Finally, it returns (u;e;z) with probability 1   2 k
0
and (?;?;?) otherwise.
Then, according to Lemma 1, if pk = h is a correct public key (of the form gx with 0  x  2c   1), the
output distribution of e Tr
ID
pk is exactly the same as that of Tr
ID
pk;sk.
Indistinguishability of keys. The public key generated by a \lossy" key generation algorithm should be
indistinguishable from that generated by the \normal" key generation algorithm. The indistinguishability
of the lossy and normal key is exactly decisional assumption that it is dicult to distinguish short discrete
logs.
Lossiness. Given a lossy public key h (which is thus of the form gx for x uniformly random in Zq), we have to
show that the probability that an impersonator interacting with an honest verier generates a valid response
is negligible.
Let I be an impersonator for the Exp
los-imp-pa
ID;I (k) experiment described in Denition 6. We rst claim
that, with high probability over the choice of x, for any choice of u 2 G, there is at most one value e such
that u can be written as gz  h e for some z in the appropriate interval. Indeed, if two pairs (z;e) 6= (z0;e0)
exist, we have gz  h e = gz
0
 h e
0
, i.e. z   xe  z0   xe0 (mod q). This implies that:
x 
z   z0
e   e0 (mod q)
which means that x can be written as a modular ratio between an element of f 2k+k
0+c+1;:::;2k+k
0+c 1g
and an element of f 2k + 1;:::;2k   1g. But there are at most 22k+k
0+c+2 such ratios. Thus, two pairs can
only exist with probability at most 22k+k
0+c+2=q.
Assume that x doesn't satisfy that relation. Then for any possible commitment the impersonator I
makes, there is at most one value of the uniformly random challenge e 2 f0;:::;2k   1g for which a valid
response can be constructed. Thus the success probability of I is not higher than 1=2k.
As a result, we obtain the required bound on the advantage of I in the experiment Exp
los-imp-pa
ID;I (k):
 Adv
los-imp-pa
ID;I (k)
  =
 Pr[Exp
los-imp-pa
ID;I (k) = 1]
   22k+k
0+c+2=q + 1=2k:
Uniqueness. Finally, all it remains to establish is that, given pk a public key output by LosKeyGen(1k)
and (u;e;z) a valid transcript output by the transcript generation function e Tr
ID
pk;k(), there never exists a
new response z0 6= z for which Verify(pk;u;e;z0) = 1. But this is clear: the verication equation implies
gz
0
=he = u = gz=he, hence gz
0
= gz, and thus z0 = z, a contradiction. u t
Conversion to a signature scheme. In order to obtain our signature scheme based on the DSDL problem,
we apply the transform provided in the previous section to the identication scheme in Figure 2. The full
description of the resulting scheme is provided in Figure 3. In addition to those of the underlying identication
scheme, the public parameters of the signature scheme also include the maximum number of signing attempts
` and a random oracle H: f0;1g ! f0;:::;2k   1g. The key pair is as before. To sign a message m, we
generate a small (but larger than x) random integer y and compute e   H(gy mod p;m). Finally, we set
z = ex + y and check whether z is in the correct range. If it's not, we restart the signature process. In case
13KeyGen(): Pick x
$   f0;:::;2
c   1g as the private key, and h   g
x mod p as the public key.
Sign(m;x):
1: ctr   0
2: y
$   f0;:::;2
k+k0+c   1g
3: e   H(g
y mod p;m)
4: z   ex + y
5: if z = 2 f2
k+c;:::;2
k+k0+c   1g and ctr < ` then
6: ctr   ctr + 1
7: goto Step 2
8: if z = 2 f2
k+c;:::;2
k+k0+c   1g then (z;e)   (?;?)
9: return  = (z;e)
Verify(m;h; = (z;e)): accept if and only if z 2 f2
k+c;:::;2
k+k0+c   1g and e = H(g
z  h
 e mod p;m).
Fig.3. DSDL-Based Signature Scheme.
of ` failures, the signing algorithm simply outputs (?;?) to indicate failure. Otherwise, the signature will
consist of the pair  = (z;e). Since the probability that z is not in the correct range is smaller than 1=2k
0
, the
signing algorithm will fail with probability at most (1  1=2k
0
)`. Moreover, the average number of iterations
is 1=(1   1=2k
0
).
As a direct consequence of Theorems 1 and 2, we get:
Theorem 3. If G is a (t0;"0)-c-DSDL group, then this signature scheme is (t;qh;qs;")-strongly existentially
unforgeable against adaptive chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model for:
" = "0 + (qh + 1) 
22k+k
0+c+2
q
+ `(qs + qh + 1) 
qs
2k
t  t0   O(qs  t1)
(where t1 is the cost of an exponentiation in G), and it outputs a valid signature with probability 1   2k
0`.
Remarks.
1. The scheme in Figure 3 uses (z;e) instead of (z;gy) as the signature since (z;e) can be used to recover
gy, but the length of e is shorter than that of gy.
2. This is an online/oine signature scheme: it can be used with coupons by pre-computing (y;gy mod p)
independently of the message. In the rare case when z is not in the right interval (which can be checked
without even computing a multiplication), it suces to use another coupon.
3. The reduction is not completely tight: there is a small loss of `  qs. As in [GJKW07], this loss can be
avoided by ensuring that the masking parameter y is always the same for a given message, either by
making the scheme stateful (keeping track of the randomness on signed messages) or by generating y as
a deterministic, pseudorandom function of the signed message and the private key, as seen in Figure 4
(but the resulting scheme is no longer online/oine).
Suggested Parameters. We propose the following parameters for an instantiation of our scheme with an
80-bit security level. The size of the public key gx mod p is 1024 bits and the size of the signature (z;e) is
k + k0 + c + k = 328 bits.
A full signature requires a single exponentiation of 248 bits in Z
p with xed base, which is about as
ecient as comparable schemes (faster than the two 160-bit exponentiations in the Katz-Wang DDH scheme,
14Sign(m;x):
1: i   0
2: y   G(x;m;i)
3: e   H(g
y mod p;m)
4: z   ex + y
5: if z = 2 f2
k+c;:::;2
k+k0+c   1g then
6: i   i + 1
7: goto Step 2
8: return  = (z;e)
Fig.4. Fully tight DSDL-based signature scheme.
Parameter Value
q prime of length  490 bits
p 1024-bit prime
G subgroup of order q in Z

p
c 160
k 80
k
0 8
Fig.5. Example parameters for the DSDL scheme.
for example). In our scheme, there is a 1=2k
0
= 1=256 chance that the signing algorithm will have to be
repeated, but this has little eect on the expected running time.
When used with coupons, the scheme is possibly the fastest option available, with an online cost of one
single integer multiplication between a 80-bit number and a 160-bit number, and no modular reduction.
5 A Signature Scheme Based on Lattices
In this section, we present a signature scheme whose security is based on the hardness of the Ring-LWE
problem. Towards this goal, we rst describe a lossy identication scheme based on the Ring-LWE problem
and then use our generic transformation in Section 3 to obtain the signature scheme.
Description of the lossy identication scheme. The full description of our lossy identication scheme
based on lattices is described in Figure 7, and for convenience we list the notation used in the scheme
in Figure 6. The secret key consists of two polynomials s1;s2 with \small" coecients chosen from the
distribution DR; (as dened in Section 2.2), and the public key consists of a randomly-chosen element
a 2 R and of the value t = as1 + s2. Under the Ring-LWE assumption in the ring R, the public key is
thus indistinguishable from a uniformly random element in R  R.
In our protocol, the prover's rst move is to create two \small" polynomials y1;y2 (larger than s1;s2 by
a factor  n) from the set M, and then send the value u = ay1 + y2 to the verier. Upon receipt of u,
the (honest) verier chooses a value c uniformly at random in the set C and sends it to the prover. After
receiving c from the verier, the prover sets z1   s1c + y1 and z2   s2c + y2 and checks whether the zi's
are both in G. If they are, the prover then sends the response (z1;z2) to the verier. If one (or both) of the
zi are outside of G (which happens with probability approximately 1   1=e2), then the prover simply sends
(?;?). Finally, the verier simply checks whether the zi's are in G and that az1 + z2 = tc + u.
At this point, we should mention that using the recent techniques from [Lyu12], it is possible to lower
the bitsize of the response (z1;z2) by choosing the polynomials y1;y2 from a normal distribution and then
doing a somewhat more involved rejection sampling when deciding whether to send (z1;z2) or (?;?) to the
verier.
15Parameter Denition
n integer that is a power of 2
 standard deviation of the secret key coecients
p \small" prime equal to 1 mod 2n
R ring Zp[x]=hx
n + 1i
C fg 2 R : kgk1  logng
M fg 2 R : kgk1  n
3=2 log
3 ng
G fg 2 R : kgk1  (n   1)
p
n log
3 ng
Fig.6. Parameters for the lattice-based scheme.
Secret key: Pick s1;s2
$   DR; and let the secret key be (s1;s2)
Public key: Select a
$   R
 and let the public key be (a;t), where t   as1 + s2
(Lossy key: (a;t)
$   R
  R)
Prover Verier
1. y1;y2
$   M
u = ay1 + y2
u                               !
2. check c 2 C c                                 c   C
3. z1   s1c + y1;z2   s2c + y2
If z1 or z2 = 2 G,
then z1   ?; go z2   ?
z1;z2                               ! check z1;z2 2 G
and u
? = az1 + z2   tc.
Fig.7. A lossy identication scheme based on lattices.
The idea of checking whether the polynomials zi are in some set and redoing the signature otherwise
is the aborting technique rst used in [Lyu08,Lyu09] and is crucial in Fiat-Shamir type lattice schemes for
masking the secret keys si while keeping the response size small and the security reduction meaningful.
Intuitively, the larger the length of the elements zi with respect to the secret keys si, the easier it is for
adversaries to break the identication scheme, and so we would be required to set the parameters higher to
avoid attacks.
Security of the identication scheme. The idea for the security proof is as follows: we rst show in
Lemma 3 and Corollary 1 that for any s1;s2, the distribution of (z1;z2) is statistically close to uniform in
the set G. This fact allows us to simulate the transcript generation algorithm without knowing the secret key
by picking z1;z2 randomly from G, picking c randomly from C and computing the corresponding challenge
as u = az1 +z2  tc. On the other hand, the hardness of the Ring-LWE problem says that a normal public
key (a;as1 + s2) is indistinguishable from a \lossy" key (a;t) chosen uniformly at random in R  R. This
is enough to see that we have constructed a lossy ID scheme if we can prove that such a random key (a;t)
is indeed lossy.
To do so, we apply a similar strategy as for the short discrete log-based scheme from x4 by showing
that if in the lossy case, for a give commitment u, the existence of two valid challenge-response pairs (c;z)
and (c0;z0) implies that t is in some sense a \short modular ratio", a property that is only satised with
negligible probability. However, a technical issue that didn't occur in x4 is that the probability that c   c0
is not invertible in R is non-negligible. We circumvent this problem by showing that, with high probability,
it becomes invertible in a quotient of R that isn't too small. This is reminiscent of techniques used, for
example, in [Mic07, Theorem 4.2].
16Theorem 4. If p  2=  n3=+ for some  > 0, and the Ring-LWE problem over R with standard
deviation  is (";t)-hard, then the identication scheme in Figure 7 is "s-simulatable, -complete, (t;")-key-
indistinguishable and "`-lossy, for:
 
1
e2  
2
en
"s  negl(n) "`  negl(n):
If, moreover, p  2=  n4=+ for some  > 0, then the identication scheme is also "c-unique for some
"c  negl(n).
Proof. Fix an element a 2 R and a rational number  2 (0;1) whose denominator is a small power of 2, so
that d = n is an integer (this constant  will ultimately be chosen arbitrarily close to 1). Dene an element
t 2 R to be an -partial modular ratio (with respect to a) when there exists (z1;z0
1;z2;z0
2) 2 G4, (c;c0) 2 C2
and a polynomial Q 2 Zp[x] of degree d dividing xn + 1 such that:
c   c0 is invertible mod Q and t 
a(z1   z0
1) + (z2   z0
2)
c   c0 (mod Q): (1)
We will need some technical lemmas, proved in Appendix A.
Lemma 2. Let t be a uniformly random element of R. Then:
Pr[t is an -partial modular ratio] 

n
d

33n32 log
7 n
p
n
In particular, if p  2=  n3=+ for some  > 0, then this probability is negligible.
Lemma 3. If s
$   DR;, c
$   C, and y
$   M, then the following inequalities hold:
Pr[sc + y 2 G] 
1
e
 
1
en
  e 
(log
2 n);
X
g2G


 Pr[sc + y = g j sc + y 2 G]  
1
jGj


   e 
(log
2 n):
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.
Corollary 1. The probability that the z1 and z2 computed by the prover upon receipt of the challenge c are
both in G is at least 1
e2   2
en. Moreover, the distributions of z1 and z2 when this is satised are statistically
close to uniform in G.
Turning to the proof, we follow the same steps as in x4. Following Denition 6, we prove the completeness
property of the identication scheme, the simultability of the transcripts, the indistinguishability of the keys
and the lossiness property.
Completeness. Corollary 1 shows that, given a key pair generated by the normal key generation algorithm,
the prover interacting with a honest verier produces a valid response with probability at least 1=e, which
is non-negligible as required.
Simultability of the transcripts. Given a normal public key pk = (a;t), we can construct a simulator e Tr
ID
pk of
the real transcript generation oracle Tr
ID
pk;sk as follows.
Let  > 1=e2 2=(en) be the probability that the prover actually responds to an honest challenge instead
of sending ? ( is a constant depending only on the public parameters). We dene e Tr
ID
pk to rst pick a
uniformly random triple (z1;z2;c) 2 G  G  C, then compute u = az1 + z2   tc, and nally output the
transcript (u;c;(z1;z2)) with probability  and (?;?;?) otherwise.
By Corollary 1, the output distribution of e Tr
ID
pk is "-statistically close to that of Tr
ID
pk;sk, with " 
e 
(log
2 n).
17Indistinguishability of keys. The public key generated by a lossy key generation algorithm should be com-
putationally indistinguishable from that generated by the normal key generation algorithm. That is exactly
the hardness of the Ring-LWE problem.
Lossiness. Let I be an impersonator for the Exp
los-imp-pa
ID;I (k) experiment described in denition 6.
In the experiment, I receives a lossy public key (a;t), i.e. a pair of uniformly random elements in R.
In particular, by Lemma 2, the probability that t is an -partial modular ratio is bounded by a negligible
value $r.
Assume that t is not an -partial modular ratio. We can see that for any choice of u 2 R, only a negligible
fraction of all elements c 2 C can satisfy a relation of the form u = az1 + z2   tc. Indeed, let c satisfy such
a relation. Then, for any other c0 satisfying a similar relation u = az0
1 + z0
2   tc0, we can write:
t  (c   c0) = a(z1   z0
1) + (z2   z0
2):
If there existed a factor Q of xn + 1 of degree d = n such that c   c0 is invertible mod Q, then, reducing
modulo Q, it would follow that t is an -partial modular ration: a contradiction. Therefore, we know that
c c0 is not invertible mod any degree-d divisor of xn +1; this means that, under the isomorphism R ! Zn
p,
it maps to a vector with fewer than d nonzero coecients, or equivalently, more than n d zero coecients.
In particular, there exists a degree-(n   d) divisor ~ Q of xn + 1 such that c0  c (mod ~ Q).
Now observe that the probability that a uniformly random element c0 2 C satises c0  c (mod ~ Q) is at
most 1=(2logn + 1)n d. This is due to the fact that for any xed value of the d higher order coecients of
c0, the function c0 7! c0 mod ~ Q is a bijection between sets of size (2logn + 1)n d, as noted in [Mic07, proof
of Th. 4.2].
Thus, since there are
  n
n d

factors of xn + 1 of degree n   d, the total fraction of elements c0 2 C which
can satisfy a relation of the form u = az0
1 + z0
2   tc0 is bounded by:
$c =

n
n   d

1
2logn
n d


1
2(1   )1  log
1  n
n
which is negligible as stated. And clearly, under the condition that t is not an -partial modular ratio, the
impersonator cannot succeed with probability better than $c.
Overall, it follows that the advantage of I in the experiment Exp
los-imp-pa
ID;I (k) is bounded as:
 Adv
los-imp-pa
ID;I (k)
   $r + $c = negl(n)
as required.
Uniqueness. Finally, we assume that p  2=  n4=+, and we want to show that, for a random choice of
lossy key pk
$   (a;t) 2 R  R and a random output (u;c;(z1;z2)) of the transcript simulation algorithm
e Tr
ID
pk associated with pk, the probability that there exists another response (z0
1;z0
2) 6= (z1;z2) such that the
new transcript (u;c;(z0
1;z0
2)) also veries correctly is negligible.
To see this, note that the new transcript veries correctly if and only if az0
1+z0
2 tc = u = az1+z2 tc,
or equivalently, if and only if:
a(z1   z0
1) + (z2   z0
2) = 0:
This means that (z1   z0
1;z2   z0
2) is a nonzero vector in the lattice:
La = f(w1;w2) 2 Z[x]=(xn + 1) : aw1 + w2 = 0 (mod p)g:
18Now, according to [SS13, Lemma 3.3], for a uniformly random choice of a 2 R and any  > 0, the rst
minimum of La in the k  k1 norm satises:4
1
1 (La) 
1
p
n
p1=2 
except with probability  24np 2n. In particular, if we set  = (1   )=2, we see that:
1
1 (La) 
r
p
n
   n3=2+=2
except with probability at most (4=p1 )2n.
On the other hand, we have seen that (z1  z0
1;z2  z0
2) was a nonzero vector in La, and its innity norm
is less than 2  n3=2 log
3 n    n3=2+=2. Therefore, the probability "c that a new transcript that veries
correctly exists satises:
"c 

4
p1 
2n
= negl(n):
This concludes the proof. u t
Conversion to a signature scheme. In order to obtain our signature scheme based on lattices, we apply
our generic transform to the identication scheme in Figure 7. The full description of the resulting scheme
is provided in Figure 8. In addition to the public parameters of the underlying identication scheme, the
parameters of the signature scheme also include the maximum number of signing attempts ` and a hash
function H mapping to polynomials in the set C H: f0;1g ! C modeled as a random oracle. The secret
key and public keys are as in underlying identication scheme.
The running-time of the scheme is determined by the cost of the operations and also by the number of
repetitions of the signing algorithm until it outputs a signature. Notice that the most expensive operations
are the three multiplications of elements in the ring R. Since multiplication in this ring can be performed
using FFT in time ~ O(nlogp), and p = poly(n), each signature attempt takes time ~ O(n). We prove that the
signature succeeds with probability approximately 1=e on each attempt (see Lemma 3 and Corollary 1) and
so the running time of the signature (and verication) algorithms is ~ O(n).
The following result is a direct consequence of Theorems 1 and 4.
Theorem 5. If p  2=  n3=+ for some  > 0, and the Ring-LWE problem over R with standard
deviation  is ("0;t0)-hard, then the above signature scheme is (t;qh;qs;")-unforgeable against chosen message
attacks in the random oracle model for:
t  t0   O(qs  t1)
" = "0 + (qh + qs)  negl(n)
(where t1 is the cost of a multiplication in R), and it outputs a valid signature with probability  1  
 
1  
1=e2+2=(en)
`
. If, moreover, p  2=n4=+ for some  > 0, the signature scheme is (t;qh;qs;")-strongly
unforgeable against chosen message attacks.
Corollary 2. The conclusion still holds when the condition on p is relaxed to p  2  n3+ (resp. p 
2  n4+) for some  > 0.
Proof. It suces to apply the previous result with  suciently close to 1. u t
4 Technically, Stehl e and Steinfeld prove this lower bound when the lattice is chosen among the lattices L
0
b1;b2 =
f(w1;w2) 2 Z[x]=(x
n + 1) : b1w1 + b2w2 = 0 (mod p)g, with b1 and b2 both uniformly random in R
, but
clearly, L
0
b1;b2 is the same lattice as Lb1b 1
2
, and if (b1;b2) is uniformly random in (R
)
2, then a = b1  b
 1
2 is
uniformly random in R
.
19KeyGen(): Pick s1;s2
$   DR; and set (s1;s2) as the private key. Select a
$   R and let the public key be (a;t), where
t   as1 + s2. Let H be a random oracle mapping to the range C.
Sign(m;a;s1;s2):
1: ctr   0
2: y1;y2
$   M
3: c   H(ay1 + y2;m)
4: z1   s1c + y1;z2   s2c + y2
5: if z1 or z2 = 2 G and ctr < ` then
6: ctr   ctr + 1
7: goto Step 2
8: if z1 or z2 = 2 G then (z1;z1;c)   (?;?;?)
9: return (z1;z2;c)
Verify(m;z1;z2;c;a;t): accept if and only if z1;z2 2 G and c = H(az1 + z2   tc;m).
Fig.8. Lattice-based signature scheme.
6 A Signature Scheme Based on Subset Sum
In this section, we construct a lossy identication scheme based on the hardness of the random SS(n;M)
problem for a prime M > (2kn+1)n32k, where k is a security parameter. The secret key is a random matrix
X
$   f0;1gnk, and the public key consists of a vector a
$   Zn
M, and a vector t = aTX mod M. In the
rst step of the protocol, the prover selects a vector y
$   f kn;:::;kngn and sends an integer commitment
u = ha;yi mod M to the verier. The verier selects a random challenge vector c
$   f0;1gk, and sends it
to the prover, who checks that c is indeed a valid challenge vector. The prover then computes a possible
response z = Xc + y (note that there is no modular reduction here), and sends it to the verier if it is in
the range f kn+k;:::;kn kgn. If z is not in this range, then the prover sends ?. Upon receiving a z, the
verier accepts the interaction if z 2 f kn + k;:::;kn   kgn and ha;zi   ht;ci mod M = u.
It is easy to see that in the case that the prover does not send ?, he will be accepted by the verier since
ha;zi   ht;ci mod M = aTXc + ha;yi   aTXc mod M = u:
Then, we observe that the probability that for any element  z 2 f kn + k;:::;kn   kgn, the probability
that the response will be z =  z is
Pr[z =  z] = Pr[y =  z   Xc] = 1=jf kn;:::;kngnj;
since all the coecients of the vector Xc have absolute value at most k. Therefore every element z in the
set f kn + k;:::;kn   kgn has an equal probability of being outputted and the probability that z 6= ? is
 = jf kn + k;:::;kn   kgnj=jf kn;:::;kngnj  (1   1=n)n  1=e:
And thus the simulatability property of the scheme is satised since one can create a valid transcript by
generating (?;?;?) with probability 1   , and otherwise pick a random z 2 f kn + k;:::;kn   kgn, a
random c 2 f0;1gk, and output (ha;zi   ht;ci mod M;c;z).
The lossy public keys are just two uniformly random vectors a and t, and so the indistinguishability of
these keys from the real keys is directly based on the hardness of the SS(n;M) problem using a standard
hybrid argument.
To show lossiness, we observe that if t is uniformly random in Zk
M, then it can be shown that with
high probability, for any choice of u 2 ZM, there is at most one value c such that u can be written as
ha;zi   ht;ci mod M. Indeed, if there exist two pairs (z;c), (z0;c0), such that
ha;zi   ht;ci = ha;z0i   ht;c0i mod M;
20then we have
ha;z   z0i   ht;c   c0i mod M = 0: (2)
The set of valid pairs (z   z0;c   c0) consists of (2kn + 1)n  3k elements. If (a;t) is chosen completely
at random, then for each of those valid pairs, the probability that Equation (2) is satised is 1=M (since
(z;c) 6= (z0;c0) and M is prime) and so the probability over the randomness of a and t that Equation (2) is
satised for any of the valid pairs is at most (2kn+1)n 3k=M, which by our choice of M, is at most 3 k. A
similar argument also shows that the identication scheme is unique with respect to lossy keys, in the sense
of Denition 7, so that the corresponding signature scheme is strongly unforgeable.
To convert this lossy identication scheme to a signature scheme, one would simply perform the trans-
formation described in Figure 1, as we did for the other schemes in this paper. And as for the lattice-based
scheme in Section 5, we point out that the technique in [Lyu12] can be used to reduce the coecients of the
signature by about a factor of
p
n to make them fall in the range f O(k
p
n);:::;O(k
p
n)gn by sampling the
vector y from a normal distribution and performing a somewhat more involved rejection sampling procedure
when deciding whether or not to send the response z. This would also allow us to reduce the modulus M
to approximately M = O(k
p
n)n  32k, which makes the SS(n;M) problem more dicult. Another possible
optimization could include making k larger, but making the vector c sparser (while still making sure that it
comes from a large enough set), which would result in a shorter vector Xc.
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A Technical Lemmas for the Lattice-Based Scheme
Lemma 4. If s
$   DR; and c
$   C, then
Pr[ksck1  
p
nlog
3 n] = 1   e 
(log
2 n):
Proof. Since each coecient of s is sampled from DZ;, we know (for example, by using [GPV08, Lemma
4.2] and the union bound) that the probability that ksk1 >  logn is e 
(log
2 n). Now observe that if we
write s =
n 1 P
i=0
sixi and c =
n 1 P
i=0
cixi, then the xjth coecient of sc is equal to
j P
i=0
cisj i  
n 1 P
i=j+1
cisn+j i.
Because all the coecients ci are randomly and independently chosen integers from the range [ logn;logn],
the coecients cisj are independent random variables in the range [  log
2 n; log
2 n] with mean 0, and so
every coecient of sc is a sum of n such values. By applying the Hoeding inequality and the union bound
over all the coecients of sc, we obtain the claim in the statement of the lemma. u t
Lemma 5. If r 2 R is any polynomial such that krk1  
p
nlog
3 n, then for every element g 2 G,
Pr
y
$  M
[r + y = g] = 1=jMj:
Proof. We have:
Pr
y
$  M
[r + y = g] = Pr
y
$  M
[y = g   r] = 1=jMj;
where the last equality is true because for all r and g dened as in the statement of the lemma, g r 2 M. u t
23Proof of Lemma 3. By Lemma 4, we know that Pr[ksck1  
p
nlog
3 n] = 1   e 
(log
2 n), and in this
case, Lemma 5 tells us that for any g 2 G, Pr[sc + y = g] = 1=jMj. Putting this all together, we get
Pr[sc + y 2 G] 

1   e 
(log
2 n)


jGj
jMj


1   e 
(log
2 n)



1  
1
n
n

1
e
 
1
en
  e 
(log
2 n)
which is the rst stated result. Similarly, we obtain:
Pr[sc + y 2 G] 

1   e 
(log
2 n)


jGj
jMj
+ e 
(log
2 n) 
jGj
jMj
+ e 
(log
2 n)
and for the same reasons, we have for any g 2 G:

1   e 
(log
2 n)


1
jMj
 Pr[sc + y = g] 
1
jMj
where the latter inequality holds because clearly, the probability over the choice of y that y = g   sc can
never exceed 1=jMj. Hence, we can bound the conditional probability
Pr[sc + y = g j sc + y 2 G] =
Pr[sc + y = g]
Pr[sc + y 2 G]
as follows:
1
jMj
 
1   e 
(log
2 n)
jGj
jMj + e 
(log2 n)
 Pr[sc + y = g j sc + y 2 G] 
1
jMj
jGj
jMj
 
1   e 
(log2 n)
1
jGj

1   e 
(log
2 n)
1 +
jMj
jGj e 
(log2 n)
 Pr[sc + y = g j sc + y 2 G] 
1
jGj

1
1   e 
(log2 n)
1
jGj


1   2
jMj
jGj
e 
(log
2 n)

 Pr[sc + y = g j sc + y 2 G] 
1
jGj


1 + 2e 
(log
2 n)

:
As a result, we obtain the desired bound:
X
g2G

 
Pr[sc + y = g j sc + y 2 G]  
1
jGj

 
  jGj 
e 
(log
2 n)
jGj
= e 
(log
2 n):
u t
Proof of Lemma 2. First x a divisor Q of degree d of xn + 1 in Zp[x], and write xn + 1 = Q  ~ Q. Since
xn+1 is separable, Q and ~ Q are coprime, so that any element t 2 R is entirely determined by its reductions
mod Q and ~ Q.
Now, let us rst estimate the number of elements  t 2 R=hQi such that there exists (z1;z0
1;z2;z0
2) 2 G4
and (c;c0) 2 C4 with c   c0 invertible mod Q such that:
a(z1   z0
1) + (z2   z0
2)
c   c0 mod Q =  t: (3)
Since kzi   z0
ik1  2(n   1)
p
n log
3 n for i = 1;2, there are at most
 
4(n   1)
p
n log
3 n + 1
n
elements
of R of the form zi   z0
i. Similarly, there are at most
 
2logn + 1
n
elements of the form c   c0. Hence, the
number of  t 2 R=hQi that can be written as the ratio (3) is at most:
 
4(n   1)
p
n log
3 n + 1
2n

 
2logn + 1
n

 
33n32 log
7 n
n
:
24Then, if we consider instead the elements t 2 R that can be written in the form (1), there are at most  
33n32 log
7 n
n
choices for their reduction mod Q, and all the possible choices, namely pn d, for their
reduction mod ~ Q. This bounds their number as pn d 
 
33n32 log
7 n
n
for any xed choice of the degree-d
divisor Q of xn + 1.
Since xn +1 splits completely in Zp, it has exactly
 n
d

divisors of degree d. Thus, we obtain the required
estimate for the probability of being an -partial modular ratio:
Pr[t is an -partial modular ratio] 
1
pn 

n
d

 pn d  (33n32 log
7 n)n =

n
d

33n32 log
7 n
p
n
:
To see that this is negligible as soon as p  n3=+ we only need to nd an asymptotic estimate of the
binomial coecient. But by the Stirling formula, we have:

n
d


1
p
2  (1   )n

1
(1   )1 
n
:
Therefore, we obtain:
Pr[t is an -partial modular ratio] 

33n32 log
7 n
(1   )1   p
n
which is indeed negligible if p  2=  n3=+, for any  > 0. u t
B Min-entropy
Let ID = (KeyGen;LosKeyGen;Prove;c;Verify) be a lossy identication scheme. Let k 2 N, and let (pk;sk)
be a key pair generated by KeyGen on input k. Let C(sk) = fProve(sk;RP) : RP 2 CoinsProve(k)g be the set
of commitments associated to sk. As in [AABN02], we dene the maximum probability that a commitment
takes on a particular value via
(sk) = max
cmt2C(sk)
n
Pr
h
Prove(sk;RP) = cmt : RP
$   CoinsProve(k)
io
:
Then, the min-entropy function associated to ID is dened as follows:
(k) = min
sk

log2
1
(sk)

;
where the minimum is over all (pk;sk) generated by KeyGen on input k.
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